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ABSTRACT 
The primary source research is going to be based upon the examination of war diaries and personal 
papers with reference to three specimen battles, or perhaps rather campaigns, during the Great War.  
Loos, in September 1915, Arras in April – May 1917 and The 100 Days between August and November 
1918.  The engagements are to be looked at with reference to manufacturing output and supply.  Quite 
simply how did the availability and delivery of supplies affect the outcome of these battles in their at-
tempt to solve the crisis of the war?  Was anything learned and implemented by manufacturing and sup-
ply after each battle?. The Great War has a huge amount to tell us, it contains many lessons for the future.  
How the British nation managed to go from an inability to manufacture all of its military requirements in 
1914 to manufacturing and supplying so much later in the war that the material losses of March/April 
1918 were absorbed and recouped and how the mobile war of August to November 1918, the 100 Days, 
was maintained and supplied is worth examining.   
1 INTRODUCTION 
The old cliché is true, when Britain declared a state of war with Germany on 4 August 1914, most people 
really did think that it was going to be over by Christmas and there was no reason for many to doubt that.  
All wars since the Napoleonic Wars had been short and fought on distant shores.  British power rested in 
the Royal Navy, not the thinly spread, small army that served more as a police force than an instrument of 
war.  Because of events and current thinking in the early years of the young century it was in the Royal 
Navy that research and development was carried out.  In the light of what happened in the Great War it 
was a blind alley.  Steel leviathans would not win the war; infantrymen fighting in the mud would; sup-
ported by rapidly developing aircraft and hitherto unknown weapons. 
While money and resources were spent on the navy the army, by contrast, was kept short of money 
and resources.  Even the high explosive shell was considered experimental in 1914  and from Boer War 
experience shrapnel was the shell of choice.  Despite the work being done on naval guns design and pro-
curement of big guns for the army was virtually non-existent.  The 18-pounder field gun was in produc-
tion and would be the mainstay of the Royal Artillery for the war.  Little or no work had been done on 
heavy guns or howitzers.  Machine guns were slow to manufacture and arrive at the battalions and even 
then they were doled out at two per battalion.  Hand grenades were experimental and in short supply 
(HMSO 1922a). Shortly after the war began the need for hand thrown bombs became obvious but the 
troops were forced to make their own from whatever they could find.  There was a reason for this.  When 
it came to war with Germany the British expected that their main contribution to the war would be the na-
vy.  The B.E.F would hold the French left flank in what would be a short land war. 
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When the Great War broke out the world faced its biggest crisis to date and at the outset British man-
ufacturing and supply were unable to cope with the requirements of the B.E.F.  Kitchener, realising that 
the war would last much longer than most did, added to the problems of manufacturing and supply by 
calling for volunteers for the army.  They came and their enthusiasm threatened to swamp the already 
struggling war effort and cause a crisis of their own.  There were no uniforms, weapons, equipment or ac-
commodation for these volunteers and Kitchener was informed at the time that the manufacturing industry 
could not fulfil their existing orders (Edmonds 19250.  A huge industrial and manufacturing effort was 
required if the war was to be fought and won and it needed to be co-ordinated.  There were to be numer-
ous attempts to ramp up output and to create some kind of control but they were all doomed to be inade-
quate until the Ministry of Munitions was set up in spring, 1915. 
2 THE MINISTRY OF MUNITIONS IN THE EARLY DAYS 
A cursory look at the manufacture, supply and consumption of 18-pounder ammunition in the first 
months of the war demonstrates the poor state of ordnance manufacturing and supply to the British Army 
at that time and highlights the need for something to be done to redress the balance and co-ordinate efforts 
of manufacturing. 
The 18-pounder ‘Quick-Fire’ was the ubiquitous field gun of the British Expeditionary Force.  First 
produced in 1903 the weapon entered service on 3 June 1904.  It had been conceived from the artillery 
experience of the Boer War and the appearance of other Q.F guns on the Continent.  Various experi-
mental field guns were produced for testing but none completely fulfilled the required criteria laid down 
by the army.  They all had good points and the new field gun was the product of a collaboration between 
Armstrong, Whitworth, Vickers and the Ordnance Factory.  By the time that the B.E.F embarked for 
France each division had three brigades of 18-pounders and one of 4.5-inch howitzers (Edmonds 1937).  
Pulled by a limber and six horses the 18-pounder gun was quick to deploy and in the hands of a good gun 
crew could fire three rounds a minute.  
Those rounds were shrapnel shells, consisting of a hollow body packed with 374 metal balls, a deto-
nation charge and a timer fuse cap.  When the shell detonated and the cap blew off the balls exploded 
from the shell in a cone like a shotgun blast and was effective up to 300 feet from the detonation.  Shrap-
nel was the field gun shell of choice of the British Army having proved effective during the Boer war 
against troop concentrations.  Shrapnel shells were very useful as fire barrages to be laid between friendly 
and hostile formations.  High Explosive or H.E for the field guns was only in the experimental phase in 
August 1914.  
When the Great War stagnated during the race to the sea the opposing forces sought to consolidate 
their flanks. Trench warfare became the norm and the B.E.F soon realised that shrapnel was no use 
against earth works, trenches and strong points.  The call went out to the War Office for H.E but there 
was little or none to be had.  Even so, if stocks had been available the 18-pounder was not capable of pul-
verising defences and trenches.  That was the job of big howitzers and big guns and there was a dearth of 
them.  
By 31 December it was obvious to all that they were in for the long haul.  The war had not ended by 
Christmas and it was going to go on for some time.  In August 1914 the B.E.F had gone to war with am-
ple supplies for the Continental campaign it had planned to fight on the left flank of the French Army, 
The war's appetite for supplies and munitions had been voracious and stocks were rapidly dwindling.  Ar-
tillery had become the method of prosecuting the war as well as providing support for the infantry and 
shells were expended daily.  Orders had been placed for shrapnel and H.E. with the Ordnance Factory and 
the ‘Trade’, or the armament contractors approved by the War Office.  The ‘Trade’ contractors were 
Messrs. Firth, Hadfield, Vickers, Armstrong, Watson Laidlaw, Camel Laird, Beardmore, and the Projec-
tile Company.  At the outbreak of war a number of private manufacturers did offer their services but their 
tooling and manpower skill base was considered to be inadequate and their offers were initially declined 
(HMSO 1922a).  Others, used to operating in the private sector found government methods of procure-
ment far too slow and they gave up waiting for contracts. 
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Figures 1-2 (HMSO 1922a) show orders and actual deliveries of 18-Pounder rounds up to 31 Decem-
ber 1914. 
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Of 708,000 complete and incomplete H.E shells ordered from the Ordnance Factory and Trade only 8,992 
were delivered. 
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Of 6,148,082 complete and incomplete shrapnel shells ordered from the Ordnance Factory, Trade and 
Dominion factories only 209,105 were delivered. The figures show just how bad things were.  Chief of 
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producers was the Ordnance Factory, which prided itself in craftsman-like work but its output was too 
low for wartime needs.  Certain factories only produced parts for shrapnel rounds not complete rounds.  
Indeed not all of the approved firms made 18-pounder ammunition and tended to specialise in the produc-
tion of certain types of shell.  Of the ‘Trade’ firms only Vickers, Armstrong, Camel Laird and the Projec-
tile Company produced 18-pounder shrapnel rounds and they also produced other types of ammunition.  
The lack of H.E is explained by its experimental nature (HMSO 1922a). No one was tooled up for it ex-
cept for the Ordnance Factory and the vast majority of the munitions workforce was not trained in the 
processes required for production.  
By March 1915 the guns on the Western Front were rationed to a small number of shells per day.  The 
18-pounders were down to 8 per day and Sir John French called for more but output was low and by April 
of that year they were down to a miserable 3 shells per day, the big guns were similarly rationed (Ed-
monds 1927).  Operations on the Western Front had to be closed down for want of shells.  There was also 
a shortage of motor lorries to deliver the shells once they arrived in France (Henniker 1937).  The crisis of 
the war was not going to be resolved this way.  
It was quite clear after the first months of the war that the system of manufacturing and supply of mu-
nitions and war materials that existed was incapable of doing the job.  Changes were attempted but it was 
not until the Ministry of Munitions under the former Chancellor of the Exchequer, David Lloyd George, 
was formed in the spring of 1915 did major changes begin.  The creation of this Ministry gave Britain its 
very first Minister and backed by very powerful legislation it was probably the most powerful organisa-
tion that Britain had ever seen. 
The reasoning behind the Ministry of Munitions was that ultimate victory or ultimate defeat depended 
upon the supply of munitions and war material.  It was soon established that it was impossible to place 
any limit on the financial cost of that production and supply.  Very soon after the outbreak of war the War 
Department and Admiralty were, in the main, freed from Treasury control.  As long as expenditure was 
vitally necessary and in the public interest Treasury sanction was not required.  The same freedom was 
extended to the Ministry of Munitions.  The sizes of manufacturing and production programmes were 
then dictated by the military requirements and not by cost.  However, some contractors soon discovered 
that while high prices charged for small production runs in peacetime were acceptable to the Government 
high prices for enormous production runs were not acceptable.  Under Lloyd George the Ministry of Mu-
nitions placed large, long term orders and deliberately over ordered.  In the case of the manufacture of big 
guns and howitzers ordered in 1915, the order was spread over two years with delivery initially expected 
in 1917.  Long-term orders enabled the Ministry of Munitions to induce contractors to undertake exten-
sions to orders which would provide earlier deliveries.  Therefore, the Ministry of Munitions had no fi-
nancial constraints and orders and manufacturing were stimulated by what was required not by cost.  In 
peacetime cost often tempered and modified what was required and indeed delivered.  The Ministry of 
Munitions had an ability to roughly estimate what was required and shape demand.  
A distinctive feature of the organisation was the employment of businessmen in key chief executive 
positions.  What became known as the “Business man system” (HMSO 1922b). Previously the Govern-
ment had only employed these men as advisors.  Now the Ministry of Munitions utilised their talents as 
deputies.  The team included; Sir George Gibb, general manager and director of two great railway opera-
tions, the North-Eastern Railway and the Underground Railway in London.  Mr. George Booth, ship-
owner and director of the Bank of England.  Major-General Percy Girouard, formerly director of military 
railway traffic in Egypt and South Africa, a former administrator of Nigeria and East Africa and since 
1913 a director of Armstrong, Whitworth & Co.  Mr. G. H. West of Armstrong Whitworth & Co, director 
of the firm and shell shop manager, a man with unrivalled knowledge of shell production.  Mr. Alfred 
Herbert head of the heavy machine tool company, Alfred Herbert & Co Ltd, of Coventry.  All of these 
men were used to big schemes and could ‘get things done’.  They had already been advising the govern-
ment but Lloyd George, in the opinion of many civil servants and politicians, breached governmental pro-
tocol and tradition when he appointed them to senior Civil Service posts.  Lloyd George believed that 
Civil Service tradition could not stand in the way of the management of the crisis.  Girouard became Di-
rector-General of Munitions Supply with Booth and West below him as departmental heads.  Herbert had 
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control of machine tools.  There were, of course, many more men in this team, one of whom was Sir Eric 
Campbell-Geddes, who had worked on the Balitmore and Ohio Railroad, U.S.A and the North-Eastern 
Railway, U.K  He later became a Major-General.  The others, some ninety men were, among other jobs, 
ordnance works men, ship builders, weapons manufacturers, distillers, a designer of public works, and an 
investments man.  A team of experienced civilians were required for what was a civilian task, manufac-
ture and distribution of goods.  Government ‘traditions’ were upheld when the Secretariat, Finance and 
Contracts Departments were concerned.  There was, of course, a good number of skilled and competent 
civil service staff to fill these posts.  The Inspection and Design Departments were staffed almost entirely 
by the military.  Another arm of the Ministry was staffed by scientists.  Mathematician, Lord John Fletch-
er Moulton, was made Head of Explosives Supply Department.  Physicist, Sir Richard Glazebrook was 
made Head of the National Physical Laboratory (HMSO 1922b).  
3 THE LESSONS 
The work so far has begun to generate some raw data and ideas for lessons.  Powerful legislation was re-
quired.  D.O.R.A or the Defence of the Realm Act was a remarkable piece of legislation that had numer-
ous sections and amendments.  It literally allowed the Ministry of Munitions and the rest of the Govern-
ment to do what they wanted.  It caused great unease in Parliament as it certainly infringed personal 
liberty.  Military or Government requisitioning of land under D.O.R.A worried many MPs who were 
landowners (HMSO 1922b). This was one piece of legislation among many. 
State Control of industry and materials.  Industry and therefore manufacturing had to be centrally 
controlled if the central goal of victory was to be achieved.  Even so central control posed many prob-
lems.  All manufacturing had to be centrally regulated; even those companies not engaged in major war 
work.  They still had to be able to turn their hand to some kind of minor war work if and when required 
(HMSO 1922c). 
Politicians learned to listen to the ‘experts’ and act upon their advice.  Kitchener in his role as a poli-
tician did not heed the advice of French or Haig in the lead up to Loos.  They told him it would fail for 
want of trained troops and supplies and they were correct (Edmonds 1928). Do not enter into a pro-
gram/operation until ready.  The British Army was not ready to fight the biggest battle it had ever faced in 
September 1915 (Edmonds 1928). All agencies had to be ready to try something new and be open to 
ideas.  A distinctive feature of the organisation was the employment of businessmen in key chief ex-
ecutive positions.  This became known as the “Business man system” (HMSO 1922b) Previously the 
Government had only employed these men as advisors. The Ministry of Munitions utilised their tal-
ents as well as seeking the experience of engineers, scientists and railwaymen among others. 
Mobilisation of the work force.  The civilian population and importantly the skilled workers had to be 
placed where they were needed.  Lloyd George believed that the war would only be won if the nation 
submitted to the sacrifice of personal liberty.  The state had to control labour (HMSO 1922b).  Support of 
the population for national projects is vital and government had to learn not to treat the population as idi-
ots.  The notion of wholesale industrial compulsion advocated by Lloyd George was an anathema to the 
British then and it would be today.  Therefore, Government ambition and plans had to be modified to take 
this national attitude into account.  Concessions had to be made to the workforce, pay and conditions be-
ing central to this (HMSO 1922b). Welfare of the workforce and population to maintain support.  The 
provision of canteens in factories went a good way towards improving the welfare of the workforce.  The 
canteens ensured that the workers on all shifts ate well. Some canteens also provide gyms, baths, and 
classrooms as well as food.  Legislation, the Munitions of War Act 1916 and Miscellaneous Provisions 
Act 1916, was used to force the employers to provide decent canteen facilities for the health and well be-
ing o their workforces (HMSO 1922d). 
4 CONCLUSION 
Under Lloyd George these businessmen and ‘experts’ were allowed a free rein and could do business 
by personal interview.  While a useful situation this also caused trouble between departments as the men 
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often, and quite naturally, put their own departments first, ahead of the greater good of the Ministry of 
Munitions. To begin with all that mattered was the swift production and supply of munitions but as the 
manpower pool and the source of materials dwindled a check had to be placed upon the deputies activi-
ties.  In essence, in the early days, 1915, it was actually impossible for a department to over produce.  As 
time went on it became necessary to be aware of the needs of other departments, all ordering equally im-
portant products.  During the latter days, the word “Co-ordinate” became almost an obsession within the 
Ministry of Munitions.  Even so, in the spring of 1915, the Ministry of Munitions was not going to turn 
things around instantaneously and in September of 1915, the British Army had to fight the biggest battle 
that it had ever been involved in at Loos.   
Fought for political reasons and at the behest of Britain’s senior ally, the French, fought against the 
advice of the top military men, Sir John French and Sir Douglas Haig, both of whom argued with the Sec-
retary of State for War, Lord Kitchener, that it would be costly in manpower and the big guns and ammu-
nition required for an operation of this size were sadly lacking.  The Battle of Loos was almost a great 
victory and the fact that it impressed the French and made the Germans sit up and take note of the British 
could not disguise the face that it was a poor defeat.  Loos was a defeat for more reasons than Sir John’s 
poor handling of reserves, the men who had to implement the operation had been correct, a lack of guns, 
ammunition and even hand grenades had contributed to the failure of a big attempt to solve the crisis of 
the Great War.  The Ministry of Munitions had a crack management team but they needed time to ramp 
up manufacturing and give the military what it required to win the war. 
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